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Abstract
We ask whether the birthplaces of Italian members of Parliament are favoured in the alloca-
tion of central government transfers. Using a panel of municipalities for the years between
1994 and 2006, we nd that municipal governments of legislators’ birth towns receive larger
transfers per capita. Exploiting variation in birthplaces induced by parliamentary turnover for
estimation, we nd that this eect is driven by legislators who were born in a town outside
their district of election. As a result, we argue that our ndings cannot be a consequence of
re-election incentives, the usual motivation for pork-barrel policies in the literature. Rather,
politicians may be pursuing other personal motives. In line with this hypothesis, we nd that
the birth town bias essentially disappears when legislative elections are near. We explore sev-
eral possible mechanisms behind our results by matching parliamentarians to a detailed dataset
on local level administrators.
Keywords: Pork-barrel politics; distributive policies; careers in politics; political economy
JEL classication: H5; H720; H770; D720
1. Introduction
In parliamentary systems elected representatives often have power to aect resource allo-
cations to favour their preferred areas or projects, a practice known as pork-barrel. In partic-
ular, in single member district systems, it is common to nd legislators targeting their district
of election. The importance of this behaviour is dicult to quantify in this context because it
potentially involves all members of Parliament and, consequently, all districts. Furthermore, it
is unclear whether favouring a particular area is a source of concern since it is typically the dis-
trict that the legislator has been elected to represent that benets from these extra resources.1
∗Address: Dept. of Geography and the Environment. London School of Economics. Houghton Street. London
WC2A 2AE. Email: F.Carozzi@lse.ac.uk
∗∗Address: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden, corresponding
author. Email: luca.repetto@nek.uu.se
1Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981), however, notice that when benets are linked to a geographical area
but costs are spread across the nation via taxation, district representatives may choose an ineciently high level
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Identifying empirically pork-barrel transfers to geographical areas presents some chal-
lenges. Given that district boundaries are generally drawn so that all districts have the same
population, there is usually no variation in the strength of the connection between districts
and the body that decides how funds are allocated. Empirical analyses of pork-barrel politics
typically use expenditure or investment data at the electoral district level and rely on either (i)
dierences in some measure of inuence of representatives such as seniority or the number of
individual votes received (Golden and Picci, 2008), (ii) over representation of certain districts
relative to their population (see Atlas et al. 1995 or Knight 2008 for the US case), (iii) comparing
representatives who have reached their term limit with those instead seeking re-election (Aidt
and Shvets, 2012).
In contrast, in this paper we use changes in the distribution of legislators’ birthplaces and
expenditure data disaggregated at the municipal level to study whether Italian members of
Parliament send additional funds to their birthplace while in oce. Using expenditure data at
a more disaggregated level than electoral districts provides us with a rich source of variation
to identify pork-barrel politics. More importantly, this level of detail allows us to understand
whether this behaviour seeks to favour voters or to pursue other personal benets for the
politician that are not aligned with those of her district. To this end, we exploit the fact that
the birthplace of roughly half of Italian members of Parliament lies outside their electoral
district.
The institutional setting in Italy, discussed in section 2, is ideal for studying pork-barrel at
the municipal level. Public transfers in Italy account for as much as one quarter of the nancial
needs of the 8,101 municipal administrations, and their distribution is a matter of discussion
and negotiation in Parliament. Even if objective criteria for allocation are established by law,
elected representatives have the possibility to divert resources towards specic targets for elec-
toral, partisan or other reasons. The way in which these incentives translate into geographical
distributions of funds depends, among other things, on electoral rules (Lizzeri and Persico,
2001). After the 1994 reform, Italy moved to a single member district system, which stayed
in place for the subsequent three elections.2 Members of Parliament in majoritarian systems
are typically re-elected within the same district, so elected representatives have strong incen-
tives to please voters in this district (Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni, 2011). We use the
fact that Italy had a single member district system in the 1994-2006 period to isolate re-election
incentives from other motives that may be driving the allocation of pork-barrel spending to
municipalities.
In our sample period, Italian municipalities are grouped into 232 electoral districts for the
Senate and 475 for the House, each electing only one representative. If the winner of one of
these races is born in a municipality that belongs to her district of election, we classify this
of spending because they do not internalise the costs on other districts. Battaglini and Coate (2007) point out that,
in a dynamic model, this is true only under certain conditions.
2More precisely, the system, promptly baptised “Minotaur” for its dual nature, prescribed that three quarters of
the seats were allocated via single member districts and one quarter proportionally.
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municipality as having an internal connection. Instead, if the winner is born in a municipality
that does not belong to this district, this municipality has an external connection. This classi-
cation is useful because a politician generating an external connection with Parliament has no
direct re-election interest in increasing the transfers to her birthplace, since her electoral base
is elsewhere. Clearly, the same argument does not apply to the case of internal connections.
We collect data on central government transfers to municipalities for the years 1994 to 2006
to test whether connected towns receive more transfers. The fact that some towns are the birth-
place of a legislator and some are not generates cross-sectional variation in the strength of the
link with the Parliament that can be used for estimation.3 In addition, parliamentary turnover
generates longitudinal variation in the connection status of some municipalities, which allows
us to include xed eects. In our baseline estimates, identication of the eect of having a
connection in Parliament is then obtained by comparing the same town when it is connected
and when it is not, thus removing all xed unobservable municipal-level factors.
In section 4 we show that municipalities with an external connection receive yearly roughly
2% more transfers per capita than other municipalities, while no increase is found for internal
connections. Over a legislature, this amounts to about 1 million Euro for a municipality of
50,000 inhabitants. This result cannot be explained by re-election incentives alone because, by
denition, the municipality of birth of external politicians lies outside their electoral district.
Given that these incentives have been the typical explanation given for distributional policies
in the literature, documenting that pork-barrel spending can arise for other reasons is one of
the main contributions of this paper. We nd no eect for internal connections even if, for
them, the municipality of birth is part of their electorate.
One reason explaining the discrepancy in our results between externals and internals is re-
lated to the trade-o between favouring their district – hence helping their re-election chances
– and securing transfers to their town of birth for personal reasons.4 In order to provide evi-
dence of this trade-o, we study how the birth town bias varies across the electoral cycle. Elec-
toral incentives for parliamentarians should be stronger when legislative elections approach
(and voters’ attention increases). Hence, politicians seeking to be re-elected in Parliament may
decide to reduce the amount of bias in transfers to their birth town in years close to elections.
Indeed, we nd that the birth town bias essentially disappears when legislative elections are
near.
This trade-o may also be dierent for internal and external politicians. Internal politicians
are more likely to have local level experience - as, for instance, town mayors or council mem-
bers - while externals have more parliamentary and government experience, and are generally
national party members. Moreover, by denition the birthplace of internals is surrounded
by other municipalities that also belong to the politician’s district. As a consequence, inter-
nal politicians may have weaker incentives to favour their town over others, since they are
3Throughout the paper we use the words town and municipality interchangeably.
4This trade-o can be framed within the career concerns model by Persson and Tabellini (2002) in which politi-
cians have to choose between providing a public good to the constituency and extracting personal rents.
3
subject to stricter voters’ control and are already well established local gures. On the other
hand, these issues play less of a role for externals, whose birth town is outside their district of
election.
In Section 5 we consider several possible explanations for the fact that municipalities with
an external connection in Parliament receive more transfers. A career in Parliament is not the
only goal of a politician and this is especially true in Italy, where turnover often exceeds 50
percent. Politicians might use transfers to their birth town as a way to improve their prospects
of a career in the local administration after serving in Congress. We identify those parliamen-
tarians who ran for oce in their birthplace after exiting Parliament, and test whether these
connections generate larger increases in transfers. An external connection through a politi-
cian later having a post-congressional career at the local level is associated with 11.9 more
Euros per capita each year to the municipality of birth relative to other externals. No addi-
tional eect is found in the case of internals. In fact, using transfers as a way to become more
popular might be especially relevant for external politicians who, being less known locally,
have stronger incentives to show interest in the birth town. On the other hand, internals have
less to win and more to lose. They have less to win because they usually have substantially
more experience at the local level and do not need to obtain more notoriety; and they have
more to lose because voters from neighbouring towns might punish favouring the birth town
over others in the district.
We then explore whether birth town bias is due to the presence of personal connections
in the municipality of birth. One of these connections arises when the local mayor and the
parliamentarian belong to the same party. In this case, members of the Parliament may follow
party guidelines and divert money to their birthplaces when they are aligned. We nd that
internal connections with an aligned mayor are associated with substantially more transfers to
their birth town, whereas for externals the evidence is much weaker. Another type of personal
connection is generated when the family or friends of an elected representative live in the
birth town. In an attempt to capture these links, we test whether connected towns whose
mayor shares the last name with a member of the Parliament receive more transfers than
other municipalities, nding no evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Finally, we run a series of placebos and robustness checks in section 6 to assess the validity
of our results. We construct dummies analogous to the ones used for our main specication but
which capture connections that should, in principle, have no eect on transfers. Specically,
we rst use an indicator for the municipality being the birthplace of a runner-up in one of the
district elections. Then, we do the same for members of the regional (as opposed to national)
Parliament and conrm that, as expected, none of those connections yields extra transfers.
We interpret these results as evidence that our ndings are not driven by confounding factors
correlated with the connection status of municipalities. The Online Appendix includes a series
of additional estimates which underline the robustness of our ndings.
Our results suggest that, overall, politicians’ decisions are shaped by motives that extend
beyond being re-elected. In this sense, our work is an empirical contribution to the litera-
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ture on the determinants of politicians’ decisions. Traditional models assume that re-election
concerns (Downs, 1957) or policy preferences (Wittman, 1983) are the main drivers of politi-
cians’ decisions. Recently, however, Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) and Keane and Merlo
(2010) emphasize that the political career is a long process of which serving in Parliament is
only a step. Because politicians are rational economic agents, they make career decisions by
comparing alternative choices. Members of Parliament typically come from the national party
ranks, local politics or the private sector, and similarly may return to one of these occupations
after oce or to continue working elsewhere. The choices they make are therefore inherently
forward-looking, as serving in Congress and actions as a legislator may aect future career
prospects. Our empirical results, hence, provide reduced-form evidence on the importance of
personal motives in representatives’ decisions while in oce.
2. The Italian institutional setting
2.1. Municipalities
At the time of the 2001 Census, Italy had 8,101 municipalities (comuni). The main sources
of revenue for municipal governments are transfers from the national and regional govern-
ments, in order to cover part of their running costs and investment projects, tax collection,
building permits, provision of public services and fees. The mayor is the head of the munic-
ipal committee (Giunta, the executive body), and is also part of the town council (Consiglio
comunale), which has legislative powers. Municipalities are grouped into 110 provinces and
20 regions, the most important sub-national administrative units. Five of them are granted
special powers due to their peculiar nature: Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia
Giulia (which are all bordering foreign countries and home to language minorities) and the
two islands, Sardegna and Sicilia.
2.2. The Parliament and the allocation of transfers
The national Parliament is composed of 945 elected legislators and is one of the largest in
the world. The lower house, (Camera dei Deputati) has 630 representatives, while the Senate
(Senato) is smaller with just 315. A complete legislature lasts for ve years although it is not
uncommon that a government crisis results in new elections being held beforehand. In fact,
in the 1994-2006 period of our sample there was one incomplete legislature that lasted for two
years (1994-1996) and two complete ones (1996-2001 and 2001-2006).
The part of state transfers to municipalities that covers ordinary running costs is deter-
mined by law on the basis of municipality’s population, surface and density, age composi-
tion, previous expenses and the presence or not of a military base (see Decreto Legislativo
n. 504/1992). Another part is meant to nance expenses for public works of primary socio-
economic interest and to foster convergence of under-endowed municipalities and is arguably
more discretionary.
The mentioned legal criteria specify guidelines for determining the transfers each munic-
ipality is entitled to, but the eective amount is determined every year in the budget law and
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approved by the Parliament in the last days of December. This law details the total amount
and destination of public spending, and sparks an intense debate both in the Parliament and
press during the whole time between discussion and approval. The budgetary process has
been repeatedly questioned both from the press and the political world itself mostly because
parliamentarians often sponsor the allocation of additional government transfers to nance
personal projects at the local level.5
2.3. The electoral law
In 1993, a major reform changed the Italian electoral regime. The open-list proportional
system that was in place since 1948 was replaced with a mix of proportional and majoritarian.
Three-quarters of the seats (475 for the Camera and 232 for the Senato) were assigned via single
member districts, each choosing one legislator, and the remaining quarter was assigned on a
proportional basis. This setup was only in place for the elections of 1994, 1996 and 2001. In
2005 a reform modied the system again and Italy moved to closed list proportional under
which the last elections of 2006, 2008, and 2012 took place. For reasons that will become clear
later, our sample is limited to the period 1994-2006 in which the single member district system
was in place.6
3. Data
3.1. Transfers to municipalities
Transferring resources to municipalities is the responsibility of the Italian Ministry of In-
ternal Aairs, and disaggregated data are available at the Ministry’s website. Valle d’Aosta,
Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia are special autonomous regions and the funding of
their municipalities follows dierent rules. For this reason, we exclude municipalities in those
regions from our analysis. We also exclude the capital, Rome.7 This leaves us with a dataset of
15 ordinary regions plus Sardinia and Sicily, containing a total of 7,470 municipalities in 1994.
Transfers are divided into current transfers, intended to cover basic running costs, and cap-
ital transfers, destined to nance investments. The aggregate amount of government transfers
has declined over time, and in 2005 it accounted for slightly more than 12 billion Euros (0.8% of
GDP). Looking at the distribution of transfers across municipalities reveals substantial hetero-
geneity, even in per capita terms. Municipalities in mountainous and southern areas receive
more money per capita, whereas in the north and especially in the river Po valley transfers are
lower (see the Online Appendix for a detailed map). Determinants of this heterogeneity are
5The fact that the budget law was used by politicians to pass various pork-barrel projects has been a well
known fact for decades. Once a former prime minister, Massimo D’Alema, described this process in these terms:
“The Parliament becomes the most squalid suq [a bazaar] at the moment of assigning funds in the budget law".
6Single member district systems are generally regarded as favouring the individual proles of parliamentarians,
and this was also the case in Italy (Cotta and Verzichelli, 2007).
7Rome, together with a few other large municipalities, are always the birth town of at least one parliamentarian,
so that their connection status has no variation over time.
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in large part population density and economic development dierences, and some areas also
benet from higher benets to cover costs for national interest infrastructures.
The dependent variable we use in the empirical analysis is total transfers, excluding past
mortgage payments, in 2005 Euros per capita. Mortgage payments are excluded because they
are funds that the central government sends to municipalities to pay instalments of old mort-
gages, taken before 1992. These transfers represent a small fraction of the total and are not
manipulable.
3.2. Data on representatives and local level politicians
We also gathered information on all members of the national Parliament for the 1994-2006
period. Information on birthplace, date of birth and party is complemented with personal
characteristics of politicians from Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010). Data on
candidates from each of the electoral districts in Italy and their electoral outcomes are obtained
from election data provided by the Ministry of Internal Aairs. The Ministry of Internal Aairs
also provides information on anyone who has been elected for public oce at the sub-national
level since 1985, including date and place of birth, party membership, education and other
basic personal characteristics. From this source we obtain data on all elected representatives
at the local level the 1985-2014 period.
In the Online Appendix we report a map with the geographic distribution of birthplaces of
parliamentarians elected in 1996. A large number is from the capital, Rome, and, not surpris-
ingly, from other large cities like Turin, Milan, Genoa or Naples. Still, there are several smaller
municipalities which are also connected to Parliament.
3.3. Other political and geographical variables
Geographical, demographic and economic characteristics are important to determine the
amount of transfers the state decides to allocate to each municipality. In our analysis we control
for these factors using information on population, surface and density of the municipality and
altitude of the city centre. We also use an indicator for the presence of a military base. In
order to control for the political orientation of voters in each municipality, we also collect
data on the vote share received by the national government coalition at the municipal level
plus information on the party of the mayor. More details on data sources are provided in the
Appendix.
3.4. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of table 1 presents a series of characteristics of the municipalities in the sample,
grouped by legislature. Municipalities are small (around 7,000 inhabitants on average), with
a mean surface of a little more than 40 km2 and a slowly increasing population density that
reached 248.2 inhabitants per square kilometre in the 2001 legislature. About 6.5% of munici-
palities have, on average, at least one connection with Parliament.
Panel B reports descriptives for all members of the Italian Parliament, divided in internals -
those who were elected in a district that includes the birth town - externals, who were elected
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in a district that does not include their birth town - and proportionally elected parliamentari-
ans. Members of the Parliament are relatively old (around 50 years old on average), predomi-
nantly men and well paid, with an average gross income of above 110,000 Euros. Self-reported
information on political careers pins down one important dierence between internals and
externals: the former are more likely to be politicians with a long standing experience at the
local level, either as elected ocials or as members of the party structure.8 On the other hand,
externals are more likely to be national level gures: besides being 8.5 percent more likely to
have been national party member in the past, they also have more experience in the Parliament
(0.6 more years on average) and are 1.8% more likely to have been members of the national
government.
4. Empirical analysis
Parliamentarians seeking re-election are typically thought to have incentives to divert pub-
lic resources to their district. But they may also have an interest in distributing these resources
unevenly inside the district, for example by reserving a special treatment to their municipal-
ity of birth. After elections, politicians may retain links with their birthplace – for example
through acquaintances, relatives, or party colleagues – that can aect their behaviour in of-
ce.9
The main objective of this section is to study empirically whether politicians favour their
birthplaces in the allocation of transfers. Given that the relationship between a politician and
her birthplace may dier if this municipality lies within the district of election or not, we need
to take this into account in our analysis. An internal politician, who is elected in a district that
includes her municipality of birth, may have a birth town bias because voters there are part of
her electorate. But for an external politician, for whom the birthplace lies outside the district
of election, this is not necessarily the case because none of her voters live there.
We dene a municipality as connected if it is the birthplace of a member of Parliament.
Specically, a municipality has an internal, external or proportional connection if it is the
birthplace of an internal, external or proportionally elected legislator currently in oce. For
each municipality i and year t, we dene three indicators, ext. connectit , int. connectit and
prop. connectit that take value one if the town has an external, an internal or a proportional
connection, respectively. We then test whether these variables aect the amount of transfers
per capita received by a municipality.
Both longitudinal and cross sectional variation in these connection indicators can be used
for estimation. Once we control for the population thresholds specied in the law regulating
transfers, a simple cross-sectional comparison reveals that connected towns receive, on aver-
8The data are taken from Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010) who dene national party members as
“members of the directive board of the party at the national level” and, instead, local party members as “members
of the directive board of the party at the local level”.
9For example, Marangoni and Tronconi (2011) show that Italian legislators elected in their district of birth tend
to sponsor more bills concerning this district than other parliamentarians.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics for municipalities and parliamentarians
1994-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005
Panel A: Municipalities
Population 6944.1 6963.6 7058.3
(29510.7) (28855.8) (28429.5)
Transfers p.c. 226.8 208.7 248.2
(249.1) (124.3) (129.5)
Surface (km2) 41.5 43.6 44.3
(274.9) (315.5) (318.9)
Pop. density 283.8 287.6 294.8
(642.1) (641.3) (646.9)
Municipalities with at least 1 repr (%) 6.5 6.4 6.3
(24.7) (24.5) (24.2)
Observations 7467 7467 7463
Internals Externals Prop. Int-ext
Panel B: Parliamentarians
Age 49.8 50.8 50.5 -1.0
9.2 9.9 9.5 0.4
Male (%) 92.6 90.4 80.6 2.2
26.1 29.4 39.6 1.2
College or higher (%) 69.4 71.0 71.3 -1.7
46.1 45.4 45.3 2.0
Income (thousand Euros) 114.2 119.7 113.2 -5.5
249.7 150.3 158.7 8.9
Previous exp. in the Parliament (years) 2.6 3.2 3.3 -0.6
4.4 5.1 5.5 0.2
Previous exp. in the Government 5.5 7.3 11.0 -1.8
22.9 26.1 31.3 1.1
Previous exp. at the province level 13.6 10.4 9.6 3.3
34.3 30.5 29.5 1.4
Previous exp. as mayor 18.0 8.9 10.5 9.0
38.4 28.5 30.7 1.5
Previous exp. as national party member 17.6 26.1 24.3 -8.5
38.1 43.9 42.9 1.8
Previous exp. as local party member 29.3 24.5 26.6 4.8
45.5 43.0 44.2 1.9
Observations 996 1122 704 2118
Notes: Panel A: averages taken over the legislature specied in the column headings (standard devi-
ations in parentheses). The number of observations refers to the number of municipalities with non
missing transfers in the rst year of each legislature. Panel B: averages across the whole sample period
(standard errors in parentheses), data from Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010). Income is
gross declared average income, in thousand Euros. Previous local level or political experience is self
reported. The number of observations in panel B refers to the number of parliamentarians in all leg-
islatures and counts re-elected candidates as dierent ones.
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age, 19 Euros per capita more transfers each year than unconnected towns, corresponding to
8% of the overall sample mean. Part of this dierence, however, may simply capture dierences
in observable and unobservable municipal characteristics that correlate with being the birth-
place of a parliamentarian. A better approach to identify the causal eect of being connected
on transfers is to exploit longitudinal variation instead.
Longitudinal variation is induced by turnover in Parliament. After each election, about
half of the Parliament is not re-elected and this changes the connection status of some mu-
nicipalities. Variation induced by parliamentary turnover is likely to be exogenous relative to
other determinants of municipal transfers. A panel xed eect estimator is a natural choice
in this setting, as it allows to control for any unobserved determinants of transfers that are
time-invariant and exploits only time variation for identication. The identifying assumption
is then that, after controlling for municipality and time eects, there are no time-varying un-
observed determinants of transfers that are correlated with our three connection variables.
This is the approach we follow below.10
4.1. Baseline specication and results
In our baseline specication we consider a regression of government transfers per capita
on three connection dummies, as dened above, and a set of controls:
transit = β1ext. connectit–1 + β2int. connectit–1 + β3prop. connectit–1 + δ′xit–1 + uit , (1)
where β1 measures the extra yearly transfers per capita that a municipality receives on average
for being the birth town of an external representative in the Parliament while β2 and β3 capture
the eect for internal and proportional representatives, respectively. We use lags instead of
contemporaneous values because transfers for t are determined in the budget law at the end of
the previous year. As usual, x is a vector of controls, δ is a conformable vector of parameters
and uit is a random disturbance term that comprises all the determinants of transfers that are
unobserved.
The choice of controls is guided by the criteria for allocation of transfers to municipalities
contained in the 1992 law we described in section 2. In particular, we include a third degree
polynomial in population, a set of dummies for each population band, lagged population den-
sity, surface in hundreds of square hectometres, a dummy taking value one if the municipality
has a military base and a dummy taking value one if the municipality is a province capital. We
also include an indicator that equals one if the most voted party in the last parliamentary elec-
tions in municipality i belongs to the coalition governing at the national level. This variables
10Another possibility would be to compare birthplaces of candidates who won the district race by a small margin
with birthplaces of close losers in a regression discontinuity design (Lee 2008, Lee and Lemieux 2010). Implementing
an RDD in our case would be, however, problematic. First, the units of observation are municipalities and not
politicians and often a municipality is the birthplace of both winners and losers. Second, nding close races that
only involve internal or external candidates reduces the sample size to a point in which it is hard to draw any
meaningful statistical inference.
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is meant to control for the possibility that the majority coalition in the Parliament may decide
to allocate additional transfers to municipalities that strongly supported them in the previous
elections.
Depending on the specication, the disturbance term uit is allowed to include year, region
or year-region dummies in order to capture xed or time-varying regional eects (e.g. dif-
ferences between southern and northern regions or changes in political orientation as well as
dierences in business or political cycles). In most specications we also include municipality-
specic xed eects to capture time-invariant dierences across municipalities. In these cases
we use the longitudinal dimension of our dataset and use the within groups estimator. Identi-
cation of the coecients of interest then comes from time variation in the connection dummies
induced by parliamentary turnover alone.11
The inclusion of xed eects allows us to control for determinants of transfers that are
potentially correlated with having a connection. For example, some municipalities may have
stronger local party structures which increase both their political clout and their chances of
being the birthplace of a member of Parliament. Likewise, a municipality may be a cultural
hub, receiving more funds for cultural matters and at the same time having both an increased
civil society participation and a higher probability of being connected. Reverse causality could
also be an issue if, for example, municipal governments that have historically received more
transfers are more likely to place a local politician in the national party lists. These issues would
be solved by the xed eect specication under the assumption that the relevant confounding
factors are xed over the sample period.
In columns 1 to 4 of table 2 we present estimation results with dierent sets of time, re-
gion and municipality dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in
all specications. Column 1 reports OLS estimates for equation 1 with year and region ef-
fects. We observe that externally connected towns are associated with 10.4 additional Euros
per capita per year, whereas the eect of having an internal and proportional connection is
positive but smaller. Nonetheless, when testing for equality of coecients we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of equality between the eects of externals and internals (p-value: 0.17)
or the equality of externals and proportionals (p-value: 0.39).12 Results in column 2-4 include
municipality xed eects plus dierent sets of time region, year and region-year dummies, to
absorb common shocks and dierent regional trends in spending.
One potential issue with using the within-groups estimator in this context is that the con-
nection dummies exhibit scarce longitudinal variation in the majority of municipalities. This
is a consequence of two combined factors. In the rst place, in the 1996 and 2001 elections
around half of all legislators were re-elected, so the connection status of their municipality of
11In this case all time invariant controls are subsumed into the xed eect and, hence, excluded from the esti-
mation.
12A few cities are so large that had to be divided into several districts, so that dening a connection in such cases
is potentially ambiguous. We address this issue by collapsing multiple districts into one that corresponds to the
municipal boundaries. As a robustness check, we also ran all estimations again by dropping all multi-district cities,
and results are unaected.
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birth was unchanged. Secondly, many medium and large cities such as Rome, Milan or Naples
show no time variation in their connection status as they are always connected. The converse
happens with the vast majority of small towns, which never are.
Despite the limited variability in the data, the within-groups estimator, in columns 2-4,
delivers results that are qualitatively similar to OLS, although the point estimates are smaller.
Specically, having an external connection in Parliament is associated to additional yearly per
capita transfers of roughly 4.8-5.6 Euros on average. This amounts to about 2.1-2.5% of the
overall sample mean (equal to 227 Euro per capita) and 2.4-2.8% of the sample median in 2005,
corresponding to a one million Euros increase in transfers over a full legislature for a small
sized province capital (these calculations are for a 50,000 inhabitants city, such as Siena or
Mantua).
Having an internal politician in Parliament does not seem to aect transfers signicantly,
as the coecient for the internal connection is very close to zero. Proportional connections are,
instead, positively associated with transfers but the coecient is imprecisely estimated (this
may be due to the fact that only one quarter of the Parliament is elected in the proportional
quota). For the within groups estimates, the hypothesis of equality between the coecient for
internal and external connections nds little support, with p-values of 0.02, 0.05 and 0.10 in
columns 2, 3 and 4, respectively. We interpret this result and the dierence in point estimates
as evidence of a dierent eect of internal and external connections. On the other hand, in the
case of proportional and external connections we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of
coecients (p-values range from 0.4 to above 0.7). We will come back to the interpretation of
these coecients later.13
To illustrate our results graphically, we also provide event study graphs in gure 1. We
pool the three elections together and denote the year after a municipality receives an external
connection as zero. The points in gure 1 are averages of our main variable, transfers per
capita, after year eects have been purged. To be consistent with out econometric specication
we consider the lagged impact of external connections. Given that we only display longitudinal
variation here, we have restricted the sample to municipalities that have some variation during
the sample period in their connection status, hence excluding municipalities that have been
always – or never – connected.
The leftmost and central panels in gure 1 display, respectively, transfers for municipalities
gaining or losing an external connection and after an election. Mean transfer for municipal-
ities that remain unconnected are included for comparison purposes in the right panel. Pre-
election and post-election averages are indicated in dashed lines. While the yearly estimates
are quite noisy we can observe that on average municipalities gaining a connection experience
a substantial increase in transfers. Municipalities losing a connection experience a decrease
in transfers which is, however, smaller in absolute terms. Finally, municipalities remaining
13For completeness, we also run the same regressions using, instead of binary indicators, a variable that counts
the number of connections and a specication with dummies for having 1, 2-3 and 4 or more connections. Results
are in line with our preferred specication and are available upon request.
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Table 2
Baseline results
OLS Within-groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c.
Ext. connect 10.4*** 5.59*** 4.81** 3.99**
(3.43) (2.17) (2.20) (1.95)
Int. connect 4.46 -1.19 -0.90 -0.15
(2.93) (2.47) (2.59) (2.27)
Prop. connect 6.28* 4.57 4.28 3.32
(3.79) (3.00) (3.05) (2.79)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Year eects Y N Y Y
Region eects Y N N N
Region-year eects N N N Y
Municipality eects N Y Y Y
R2 0.39 0.64 0.66 0.67
Observations 89203 89203 89203 89203
Notes: The dependent variable is transfers from the central government in 2005 Euros per
capita. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipality level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
without a connection experience a very slight change in average transfers equal to about 1
Euro per capita.
Figure 1
Event study graphs
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Notes: These graphs plot the yearly evolution of transfers received by municipalities gaining
(left panel) or losing (central panel) an external connection. We label the year after an election
(1997 and 2002) as zero. Municipalities not gaining any connection are also reported in the
rightmost panel for comparison. Transfers per capita are in Euros (after removing year eects
and adding the estimated constant term to all coecients). Means before and after elections
are represented as dashed horizontal lines.
4.2. Internal and external politicians: dierent incentives
The typical explanation for pork-barrel spending in the literature is that politicians that
want re-election have geographically concentrated incentives to please their district (Weingast,
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Shepsle and Johnsen 1981, Aidt and Shvets 2012). It is then natural to ask whether our results
are driven by dierences in the electoral incentives of internal and external politicians. In our
period of study roughly half of the Parliament was re-elected in each legislature. Among those
re-elected in the majoritarian quota, around 83% did so in the same electoral district. If we look
at transitions between internal, external and proportional statuses we see that 80% of externals
remain externals, about 17% go into the proportional quota, and only 3% become internals.14
Given that re-election in other districts is rare, favouring voters in the current district appears
to be a reasonable strategy to pursue.
A consequence of this argument, however, is that electoral incentives are an unlikely ex-
planation for our ndings, as it is externals that are associated with additional resources to
their birthplace, and this birthplace lies outside their district of election. For internal politi-
cians we nd no eect, despite the fact that their birth town does belong to their district. This
is not particularly surprising if we bear in mind that the municipality of birth generally only
accounts for a small fraction of the district’s population, and electoral incentives for an internal
politician may discourage her from favouring her birthplace.
The Trade-o between Electoral Incentives and Birth-Town Bias
In order to investigate the interplay between re-election incentives and the birth town bias
documented above we study how the estimated eects vary across the electoral cycle. Electoral
incentives are likely to be especially pressing towards the end of the legislature when voters’
attention rises.15 By interacting our connection variables with indicators for being in the rst
or in the last year of the term we can test for the existence of a cycle in transfers.
The rst year dummy takes value one in election years (that is in 1994, 1996 and 2001),
while last year is one in 2000 and 2005.16 We estimate the xed eect model with year-region
dummies including the interactions of the rst and last year indicators with our connection
variables and report results in table 3. We keep the connection variables in all specications,
and include dierent interactions in each column.
Results in column 1 show that in the rst year of a legislature all types of connections are
associated with additional positive spending to municipalities – although the coecients are
statistically indistinguishable from zero – while the eect for the remaining years, captured
by the non-interacted connection dummies, is positive only for externals and proportional.
When we include, in column 2, only the interactions for last year of the term, we see that
spending is remarkably reduced in the last years compared to the rest of the legislature. The
negative sign of the interaction terms and the magnitude of the coecients suggest that the
14Similar gures hold for internals with 77% remaining internals, 17% becoming proportionals and roughly 6%
becoming externals.
15This would be a case of an opportunistic spending cycle, in which politicians may manipulate public policy in
order to increase their chances of re-election. For evidence on this, see, e.g. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) or,
in the Italian context, Repetto (2015) and Alesina and Paradisi (2014).
16Given that the 1994 term ended unexpectedly, we do not consider 1995 as the last year of the legislature (its
dummy is set to zero). Including it, however, leaves results qualitatively unchanged. Also, repeating the exercise
using the rst two and last two of the legislature (instead of just one) leads to very similar results.
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Table 3
Spending cycle results
(1) (2) (3)
Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c.
Int.*rst year 3.18 2.04
(2.09) (2.02)
Ext.*rst year 3.20 1.91
(2.60) (2.52)
Prop.*rst year 1.45 0.39
(3.07) (3.10)
Ext. connect 3.15* 4.99** 4.40**
(1.66) (2.06) (1.71)
Int. connect -1.06 0.69 0.024
(2.02) (2.34) (2.04)
Prop. connect 2.86 4.01 3.86
(2.36) (2.93) (2.49)
Int*last year -6.07*** -5.46***
(1.35) (1.07)
Ext*last year -6.53*** -5.97***
(1.51) (1.12)
Prop.*last year -5.19*** -5.06***
(1.92) (1.76)
Controls Y Y Y
Year eects Y Y Y
Region eects N N N
Region-year eects Y Y Y
Municipality eects Y Y Y
R2 0.67 0.67 0.67
Observations 89203 89203 89203
Notes: The dependent variable is transfers from the central government in
2005 Euros per capita. First year is an indicator for being in the rst year of
the legislature (1994, 1996 and 2001), whereas last year is an indicator for be-
ing in the last year (2000 and 2005). All specications include municipality
and year-region xed eects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedastic-
ity and clustered at the municipality level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
transfers received by all connected municipalities drop to the level of unconnected ones in the
pre-election years. In the last column we include all interactions, and the coecients maintain
the signs although they slightly vary in magnitude.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this exercise is that the birth town bias is
substantially reduced in the years preceding elections, possibly because politicians increase
transfers only when re-election in Parliament is not an immediate concern. This suggests that
the politician faces a trade-o between pushing to send pork to her birthplace and working to
please her electorate. This trade-o can be seen as a particular case of the one at the heart of
the career concerns models in Persson and Tabellini (2002), where politicians need to choose
between extracting rents to their personal benet and supplying a public good, to please voter
and be re-elected. Even if internals and externals share the same preference for sending money
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home, the dierence in birth town bias could still arise as the result of the dierent trade-os
that both politicians face.
To further investigate this point, we inspect the legislative activity of internals and exter-
nals. We complement our data on Parliament members with the dataset used in Marangoni and
Tronconi (2011), which includes information on the number of private member bills that each
politician presented as rst signer disaggregated into those that are directed to i) any Italian
region, ii) her region of election and iii) her region of birth.17 Those bills rarely become law but
are used by parliamentarians as a way to take position and as a signal to their constituency of
their daily work. We report tabulations for these variables separating internals and externals
in table 4.
Table 4
Localness of politicians
Panel A: Internals, externals and bills
Internals Externals Ext - int
# all bills 10.85 10.68 -0.17
[1.28]
# regional bills (all regions) 1.58 1.01 -0.57∗∗∗
[0.20]
of which:
% bills to region of election 84.49 65.40 -19.10∗∗∗
[4.54]
% bills to region of birth 84.49 12.25 -72.24∗∗∗
[4.09]
Observations 371 156
Panel B: Test if externals disproportionally target birthplace
p-value
Unweighted 0.026∗∗
Population Weighted 0.097∗
Notes: Private member bills sponsored by members of the Camera who
sponsored at least one bill. 1996 and 2001 legislatures only. Standard er-
rors are reported in parenthesis. In panel B we report p-values for mean
comparison tests for the share of regional bills sponsored by externals that
are directed to their region of birth (12.25%). In the Unweighted line we re-
port the p-value of a t-test of the null that this number is statistically dif-
ferent from 5%. In the Population weighted line, instead, we compare the
share of birth region bills with the share of Italian population living in
that region, and test the null that the dierence between the two is zero.
Source of legislative data: Marangoni and Tronconi (2011).
The average number of bills sponsored per term is comparable in both categories, but there
17Notice that bills are classied at the regional level, so that we are not able to tell whether bills were targeted to
a specic birthplace or to other municipalities within the region of election. For this reason we exclude from our
analysis those externals that are elected inside their region of birth. Data are available only for the Camera and for
the 1996 and 2001 legislatures.
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are dierences in the target of these bills. Internals sponsor more regional bills and more bills
directed to their region of election (and birth) than externals. Of all sponsored bills, internals
devote a larger fraction to their region of election. In the second column we see that in their
legislative activity externals target both their region of election and, interestingly, their region
of birth, with as much as 12.25% of all regional bills they sponsor. However, given that Italy
has 20 regions, if politicians sponsor several regional bills during a legislature, some might be
directed to the region of birth by mere chance even if no targeting was planned. To test whether
there is evidence of externals deliberately targeting their birth region over others we perform
two statistical tests. In the rst case (unweighted) we compare the observed gure with 5%
- i.e. the value that one would expect if externals target bills randomly across the 20 Italian
regions. In the second test (population weighted) we compare the share of bills to the region of
birth to the share of Italian population living in that region.18 This procedure aims to take into
account that larger regions are more likely to be targeted. The p-values for these statistical
tests are reported in panel B of table 4. In both cases, at the 10% level we reject the null that the
observed gure is the result of chance. We interpret these results as evidence that externals
disproportionately target their region of birth in legislative eorts, which is consistent with
the birth town bias in transfers documented in the baseline results of table 2.
District Level Analysis
If the amount of resources available for distributing pork is limited and internals are more
concerned about their district of election, districts that elected an external politician might
receive, on average, less transfers than the ones represented by an internal. In order to test this
hypothesis we aggregate transfers at the district level for both the Camera and the Senato. We
then regress transfers per capita on an indicator that equals one if the district is represented by
an external politician, separately for each chamber. We add as controls a cubic in population,
density, surface and dierent sets of time or region-time dummies. After dropping special
regions and multi-district cities such as Milan, Palermo and Rome, we are left with 364 districts
for the Camera and 187 for the Senato.
Since each district is necessarily represented by either an internal or an external politician,
the coecient on ext.connect can be interpreted as the conditional eect of having elected an
external on transfers.
We see in table 5 that municipalities in districts that elected an external representative in
the Camera receive between 12.6 and 24.2 less Euros per capita in government transfers each
year (for the OLS specications, columns 1-3), and the same pattern is found for the Senate.
Given the very small time series variation (few districts switch from an internal to an external
in the sample), however, when we include district xed eects the estimated coecients are
not signicantly dierent from zero at conventional levels.
18Specically, for each politician, we subtract this share from the share of regional bills that are directed to the
region of birth. Then, we take the average of all these numbers and test the null hypothesis that this average is
zero.
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Table 5
District-level analysis
Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c.
Panel A: Camera
Ext. connect -24.3*** -12.7*** -12.6*** -0.90
(4.69) (3.29) (3.35) (2.00)
R2 0.11 0.51 0.57 0.83
Observations 4368 4368 4368 4368
Panel B: Senato
Ext. connect -26.8*** -7.57** -8.18** 2.33
(5.43) (3.72) (3.88) (3.11)
R2 0.18 0.63 0.70 0.88
Observations 2244 2244 2244 2244
Controls Y Y Y Y
Year eects Y Y Y Y
Region eects N Y N N
Region-year eects N N Y N
Constituency eects N N N Y
Notes: The dependent variable is transfers from the central government in 2005 Euros per
capita, aggregated at the district level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered at the district level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
This result provides some additional evidence in favour of the hypothesis that internals
may be more focused on favouring their district of election than externals. Moreover, if we
also consider that we nd birth town bias for externals and not for internals, it is consistent
with both types of politicians standing in dierent points of the trade-o between re-election
incentives and birth town bias.
As the results in this section suggest, re-electoral incentives cannot explain the observed
birth town bias. Moreover, favouring the district of election and the town of birth seem to
be competing objectives, each being more or less pressing in dierent years of the term and
among dierent types of politicians. In particular, pleasing the district’s voters seems to be
more compelling for internals than for externals as argued above and shown in Table 5. Given
that re-election incentives are an unlikely explanation for our ndings, the following section
is devoted to investigating possible alternative mechanisms.
5. Mechanisms
This section explores possible mechanisms behind the birth town bias. We consider two
potential channels. First, we investigate the role of post-congressional careers of members of
the Parliament, and then we consider the eect of personal connections in their birth towns
on transfer decisions. The role of internal migration of Italian voters as a possible source of
electoral incentives driving birth town bias is explored in the Online Appendix.
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5.1. Post-congressional career
In each election between 1994 and 2006, about half of the Parliament was renewed. High
turnover has historically forced many parliamentarians to seek a career after Congress. As
Merlo et al. (2008) show, 44.2 percent of all legislators in their sample for post-war Italy con-
tinued in politics after exiting Parliament, and more than one third of them were elected at the
local level (town, province or region).
In light of this, legislators may divert transfers to their birth town as a way to improve
their prospects of a local career at the municipal level. A direct test of the link between
post-congressional career concerns and transfers is infeasible because meaningful measures
of popularity at the local level are generally unavailable. Yet, there is at least one veriable
implication: parliamentarians who are interested in taking a position in their birth town later
should be the ones who most actively aect transfers while in oce.
We collect data on all elected ocials at the town level – that is, mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the council, as well as mayoral candidates – for the period 1994-2014 and match
them with our legislators’ data using full name, year and town of birth.19 Around 10.9% of the
members of the Parliament pursued a post-congressional career in the birth town according to
our denition. Roughly 18.7% of internals go back to the birth town, as opposed to only 4.7%
of externals and 9.8% of proportionals. This dierence does not necessarily reect dierences
in preferences but may simply be the result of the fact that internals, who are also much more
likely to have a pre-congressional career at the local level, are better known in the birth town
and have easier access to connections.
In order to test whether our results are driven by future career concerns, we add to our
baseline specication interactions of our connection dummies with indicators that equal one
when the corresponding connection is driven by at least one legislator with post-congressional
experience in their birthplace. In our denition a politician has post-congressional experience
if, after exiting Parliament for the rst time, she goes back to the birth town and runs for mayor
or is elected as committee member or town councillor.
Estimation results are presented in the rst column of table 6, in which we estimate our
baseline model with time eects only.20 Results are consistent with the career concerns hy-
pothesis: externals with a subsequent post-congressional career are associated with 11.9 more
transfers to the birth town than other externals. The positive coecients suggest that exter-
nals with a subsequent career at the local level are more actively transferring resources to their
birthplace while in oce.
In the baseline results, internals do not appear to divert transfers home and the additional
eect for those who later pursue a post-congressional career at the local level is also indistin-
19Although it is possible that there are politicians with coinciding name, year and town of birth in our dataset, we
believe that mismatches using this algorithm are rare. The data on mayoral candidates do not include information
on neither the year nor the municipality of birth so the matching for candidates is done using the full name only.
20In this section we have to further split connections into small groups, hence reducing even more the variation
in the data. For this reason, we choose not to include region-time interactions in any of the specications. Once
including region-time interactions, although signs are preserved, statistical signicance is sometimes lost.
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guishable from zero. This may be explained by the fact that – even if internals and externals
had the same preference for sending money home – internals might face a higher electoral
cost of favouring their municipality relative to externals, for whom the birth town is outside
the district of election. Moreover, internal politicians are already well established local gures
and, hence, may not need to further improve their popularity at the local level.
While this empirical specication is the best we can do given the available data, it has some
limitations that aect the interpretation of the results. The experience variable is obtained
using ex post information on realized transitions of legislators to local governments. However,
the decision to transfer funds to the birthplace is taken previously, when the legislator does
not know when she will be leaving Parliament and whether she will pursue a career at the
local level at all. Furthermore, for some politicians the career in Congress was still not over in
2014, when our sample ends. Therefore, our local experience variables are only a proxy for the
intention of the politician to go back to her birthplace and point estimates of the interaction
terms may be downward biased.
5.2. Personal ties
There are several possible explanations behind the birth town bias other than career con-
cerns. For example, politicians may have a personal connection to interested parties in their
town of birth. One type of interested party is the local mayor. Members of the Parliament
might be more inclined towards sending resources home if the mayor is of her same party.
To see whether being aligned with parliamentarians helps municipal governments to se-
cure additional transfers we construct, for each type of connection, an indicator that equals
one if municipality i has at least one connection in year t – 1 belonging to the same party as
the mayor in oce. The three indicators are then added to our estimating equation 1. Results
are reported in column 2 of table 6. Due to the widespread presence of independent candi-
dates who run at the local level without the support of national parties, the number of aligned
municipalities in the sample is relatively small.21 In fact, of all connected towns, only 8.3%-
34.9% (depending on the year) of all municipalities are aligned. Estimates reveal that internals
are associated with substantially more transfers to their birth town when this town is aligned
with at least one parliamentarian. Specically, internal connections favour their birth town
with roughly 15 Euros per capita each year if the mayor belongs to their same political party, a
coecient that is more than three times larger than the baseline eect found for external con-
nections and equal to almost 7% of the sample mean. No additional eect is found for external
(and proportional) connections when the mayor of their town is aligned.
Notice that this does not necessarily contradict the baseline result of no eect of internal
connections. In fact, it may be the case that internals are willing to pay the electoral cost
that comes from favouring a town over others only when the mayor belongs to their party.
Additionally, as table 1 in section 3 suggests, internals are more likely to be part of the local
21For example, in 2005 almost 85% of all Italian mayors belonged to a list that was not ocially connected to any
party.
20
Table 6
Mechanisms
Post-congress Aligned party Same surname All variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c.
Ext. connect 4.09* 4.71** 4.55** 3.89*
(2.32) (1.96) (2.23) (2.04)
Int. connect -1.03 -3.44 -0.94 -3.27
(2.86) (2.55) (2.72) (2.97)
Prop. connect 4.93 5.18 4.39 5.60
(3.82) (3.67) (3.12) (4.32)
Ext.*Posterior exp. 11.8* 11.7*
(6.80) (7.02)
Int.*Posterior exp. 0.11 0.13
(4.45) (4.53)
Prop.*Posterior exp. -5.74 -4.49
(10.27) (9.52)
Ext.*Aligned Party 1.28 1.44
(8.66) (8.51)
Int.*Aligned Party 15.5*** 15.9***
(5.78) (5.84)
Prop.*Aligned Party -7.63 -7.25
(7.94) (7.67)
Ext.*Same Surname 8.85 4.08
(6.96) (7.68)
Int.*Same Surname 0.19 -3.70
(4.50) (4.89)
Prop.*Same Surname -1.80 0.94
(6.90) (6.80)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Year eects Y Y Y Y
Region-year eects N N N N
Municipality eects Y Y Y Y
R2 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
Observations 89203 89203 89203 89203
Notes: The dependent variable is transfers from the central government in 2005 Euros per capita.
The variable Posterior exp is a dummy equal to one if municipality i is the birth town of at least
one parliamentarian in oce in t–1 that pursued a career there after leaving Parliament. For each
type of connection (Internal, External or Proportional), the interaction with the Aligned Party is
one when municipality i has at least one connection in year t – 1 belonging to the same party as
the mayor in oce. The variable Same surname is one if the municipality is the birth town of a
member of the Parliament in oce that has the same surname as the current mayor. All specica-
tions include municipality and year xed eects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the municipality level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
party administration and they may be willing to acknowledge their electoral base and their
party for their support by helping the mayor and her government with additional resources.
Another type of personal connection politicians may have is that generated by friends, fam-
ily, or other acquaintances – such as members of the local party structure that helped them
reach the Parliament. Testing whether the birth town bias is related to this type of personal
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connections is challenging because most of this network of relationships is unobservable. To
try to obtain some evidence on this hypothesis we construct, for internals, externals and pro-
portional connections an indicator that is equal to one if a municipality is the birth town of at
least one member of the Parliament in oce that has the same surname of the current mayor.
This variable is imperfect because sharing the surname does not necessarily mean being related
and, vice versa, two persons with dierent surnames might be relatives or close friends. But
it might still capture, albeit noisily, whether the mayor has some kind of personal connection
with members of Parliament. Depending on the year, there are from 19 to 33 parliamentarians
in our sample that share the surname with the mayor of their birth town, and in more than
half of the cases these two persons are actually the same.22
In column 3 of table 6 we show that municipalities whose mayor shares the same last
name with at least one member of the Parliament do not appear to receive additional transfers.
Although the estimated eect for the external connections is positive, the little variation in
this variables renders the point estimates statistically indistinguishable from zero, so that this
exercise brings no evidence in favour of an additional eect of sharing the same name with
the mayor.23
In the last column of the table we include all the interactions discussed before to see
whether one mechanism prevails over the other. Results are in line with the separate esti-
mations, suggesting that post-congressional careers and party alignment both play a role in
the allocation decisions of members of Parliament. This section also sheds light on the in-
terpretation of the baseline result for externals by showing that an important driver of these
politicians’ decisions could be their post congressional career concerns.
6. Placebos and robustness checks
While the municipality eects deal with xed unobservable dierences, it is still possible
that time-varying shocks which aect both transfers and the political inuence of a municipal-
ity bias the baseline estimates in table 2. The idea of the placebos we propose below is to use
variables that may be correlated to a municipality’s political salience but that are not directly
related to the budgetary process.
First, we use data on elections outcomes to pin down the identity and the birth town of
runners-up in all single member district votes. In a single member district election there is
always a winner, who takes a seat in Parliament, and one or more losers. We construct a
dummy variable, false ext. connect, analogously to ext. connect but taking value one when a
municipality is the birthplace of at least one runner-up instead of a winner. Suppose that a
municipality is aected by some shock that improves its political visibility. This shock simul-
taneously increase the amount of transfers received and possibly also the probability that a
22In the period covered by our sample, the two oces were not incompatible, see Testo Unico degli Enti Locali
(D.lgs. 267/2000), lemma 63.
23Using an indicator taking value one when the mayor is a member of parliament yields very similar results.
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politician born there stands for Parliament. While this co-movement would bias our baseline
estimates, it would also induce a positive correlation between false ext. connect and transfers as
long as the runner-up dummy is also aected by the political visibility shock. Following this
argument, we replace our connection variables with the ones constructed using runners-up
instead of winners and estimate the model again. The negative and statistically insignicant
coecient estimates for both of these indicators in column 1 of table 7 reassuringly suggest
that our results are not driven by the time varying political weight of dierent municipalities.
A similar intuition motivates our second placebo test. We use a dummy reg. connect taking
value one if municipality i is the birthplace of a politician elected in a regional (as opposed to
national) Parliament. As with the previous placebo, a signicant coecient here would point
to some confounding factor driving both transfers and the probability of having a connection
as there is no plausible way through which regional legislators may aect national transfers
directly. In column 2 of table 7 we show that having a regional connection, as expected, has
no impact on central government transfers.
In the years prior to 1992 municipalities were allowed to take on mortgage debt that
was later assumed by the central government. The instalments of this debt were paid yearly
through transfers to the municipality for the corresponding amount.24 After the system ceased
to exist transfers went on for the following years to complete the payment of outstanding mort-
gages. In our third placebo we use these transfers as our dependent variable. In column 3 of
table 7 we show that our connection variables have no eect on this type of transfers.
Our nal placebo changes the dependent variable to ordinary transfers (fondo ordinario).
These are part of our total transfers variable but are destined to nance current expenditures
and are arguably harder to manipulate. Column 4 of table 7 conrms this hypothesis by show-
ing that our connection variables have indeed a small and insignicant eect on ordinary
transfers. Note that the R2 of the regression is substantially higher than before, meaning that
the control variables suggested by the transfers law criteria (e.g. population, density etc.) do a
much better job in explaining the variation in ordinary transfers than do for total transfers.
To test the robustness of our baseline results, we consider three variations of the origi-
nal model. First, we estimate the model using the logarithm of transfers per capita as our
dependent variable. This leads very similar results to those presented before, with external
connections increasing transfers per capita by 1.62 percent. Our second robustness check in-
cludes the runner-up and regional connection variables false ext connect, false int connect
and reg connect as controls in the baseline specication. Our main results remain qualitatively
unchanged. Finally, we estimate a model in which connections are divided into regular con-
nections (as dened above) and connections through members of a “key” commission in the
Parliament. With this specication we want to check whether more inuential (or simply bet-
ter positioned) politicians are more capable to manipulate transfers. Results suggests that it
24These are called the fondo sviluppo investimenti. Recall that we excluded those transfers from our main depen-
dent variable denition, see section 2.
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Table 7
Placebos
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Mortg. tr. p.c. Ordinary tr. p.c.
False ext. connect -1.77
(1.99)
False int. connect -0.64
(1.51)
Reg. connect 0.34
(1.28)
Ext. connect -0.32 1.30
(0.80) (1.41)
Int. connect -0.048 0.033
(0.68) (1.37)
Prop. connect -0.54 2.19
(0.83) (1.79)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Year eects Y Y Y Y
Region eects N N N N
Region-year eects Y Y Y Y
Municipality eects Y Y Y Y
R2 0.67 0.67 0.86 0.95
Observations 89203 89203 83889 89183
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is transfers from the central government. In
column 3 the dependent variable is transfers for past mortgages, whereas in column 4 we use
ordinary tranfers. All quantities are in 2005 Euros per capita. Standard errors are robust to het-
eroskedasticity and clustered at the municipality level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
is indeed legislators’ actions and not municipal-level unobservables that are behind our main
results. Detailed results for these robustness checks are presented in the Online Appendix.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we use data on government transfers at the municipal level to study if the
birth towns of Italian members of Parliament are favoured in budgetary allocations. By using
the town of birth as the link between geographical areas and political institutions, we exploit
a dierent source of variation from those used in previous analyses of pork-barrel politics.
This level of disaggregation, together with the single member district system in place in Italy,
allows us to disentangle electoral motives from other possible drivers of birth town bias.
In order to study how electoral incentives shape allocation decisions, we divide politicians
into those having their birthplace within their district of election (internals) and those having
their birthplace elsewhere (externals). We observe that municipalities connected to Parliament
through an external receive roughly 2 percent larger yearly per capita transfers. Given that
the birth town bias appears to be driven only by externals and that these politicians have no
electoral incentives to favour their birthplace, we conclude that re-election incentives cannot
be driving our results. Re-election incentives for a parliamentarian appear, instead, to compete
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with the incentive to favour the town of birth. In particular, we nd that the amount of birth
town bias evolves over the term, being large in the years just after legislative elections and
disappearing toward the end of the term, when politicians are most focused on being re-elected
in Parliament.
We then turn to study other possible incentives to favour the birthplace. First, we argue
that post-congressional career considerations by incumbent legislators explain at least part of
our results. By increasing transfers while in oce, politicians may be able to improve their
chances of being elected at the local level after exiting Parliament. Using data on politicians’
career proles, we nd an additional eect of external parliamentarians who later ran for a
local oce. Then, we explore whether the presence of personal ties in the birth town could
provide an alternative mechanism. In order to capture these links, we consider both alignment
between the parliamentarian and the mayor along party lines and the existence of family links,
captured by the legislator sharing the last name with the mayor. While we nd that party
alignment can play a role for internal politicians, it does not appear to be a relevant mechanism
for externals. Finally, we do not nd evidence in favour of an eect of family links between
the politician and the local mayor.
25
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the editor, two referees, Manuel Bagues, Stéphane Bonhomme,
Alessandra Casella, Eshien Chong, Torun Dewan, Jon Fiva, Christian Fons-Rosen, Stefano
Gagliarducci, Mónica Martínez-Bravo, Claudio Michelacci, Massimo Morelli, Diego Puga, and
Pilar Sorribas-Navarro for useful comments and suggestions. We also thank seminar partic-
ipants at CEMFI, Harvard Government, LSE SERC and LSE Government, together with par-
ticipants at the 2013 EPCS meeting and the V Workshop on Fiscal Decentralization at IEB for
valuable comments and remarks. We thank the Italian Ministry of Internal Aairs and Ste-
fano Gagliarducci for data on candidates. Funding from the European Commission’s Seventh
Research Framework Programme through the European Research Council’s Advanced Grant
“Spatial Spikes” (contract number 269868) and nancial support from the AXA PhD scholar-
ship are gratefully acknowledged by the rst and second author, respectively.
References
Aidt, Toke S., and Julia Shvets. 2012. “Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Ev-
idence from Seven US State Legislatures.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
4(3): 1–29.
Akhmedov, A, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2004. “Opportunistic Political Cycles : Test in
a Young Democracy Setting.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (4): 1301–1338.
Alesina, Alberto, andMatteo Paradisi. 2014. “Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian
Cities.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc NBER Working Papers 20570.
Atlas, Cary M., Thomas W. Gilligan, Robert J. Hendershott, and Mark A. Zupan. 1995.
“Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why.” The
American Economic Review, 85(3): pp. 624–629.
Battaglini, Marco, and Stephen Coate. 2007. “Ineciency in Legislative Policymaking: A
Dynamic Analysis.” The American Economic Review, 97(1): 118–149.
Cotta, Maurizio, and Luca Verzichelli. 2007. Political institutions in Italy. Oxford University
Press.
Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane, and AntonioMerlo. 2005. “A Political Economy Model
of Congressional Careers.” American Economic Review, 95(1): 347–373.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” Journal of
Political Economy, 65(2): pp. 135–150.
Gagliarducci, Stefano, TommasoNannicini, and PaoloNaticchioni. 2010. “Moonlighting
politicians.” Journal of Public Economics, 94(9-10): 688–699.
26
Gagliarducci, Stefano, Tommaso Nannicini, and Paolo Naticchioni. 2011. “Electoral
Rules and Politicians’ Behavior: A Micro Test.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
3(3): 144–74.
Golden, Miriam, and Lucio Picci. 2008. “Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-1994.”
American Journal of Political Science, 52: pp. 268–289.
Keane, Michael P., and Antonio Merlo. 2010. “Money, Political Ambition, and the Career
Decisions of Politicians.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(3): 186–215.
Knight, Brian. 2008. “Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of
Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress.” The Economic Journal, 118(532): 1785–1803.
Lee, David S. 2008. “Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House elec-
tions.” Journal of Econometrics, 142(2): 675–697.
Lee, David S., and Thomas Lemieux. 2010. “Regression Discontinuity Designs in Eco-
nomics.” Journal of Economic Literature, 48(2): 281–355.
Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico. 2001. “The Provision of Public Goods under Alter-
native Electoral Incentives.” American Economic Review, 91(1): 225–239.
Marangoni, Francesco, and Filippo Tronconi. 2011. “When Territory Matters: Parliamen-
tary Proles and Legislative Behaviour in Italy (1987-2008).” The Journal of Legislative Stud-
ies, 17(4): 415–434.
Merlo, Antonio, Vincenzo Galasso, Massimiliano Landi, and Andrea Mattozzi. 2008.
“The Labor Market of Italian Politicians.” Singapore Management University, School of Eco-
nomics Working Papers 15-2008.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2002. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Pol-
icy. Vol. 1 of MIT Press Books, The MIT Press.
Repetto, Luca. 2015. “Balance sheet disclosure and the budget cycle of Italian municipalities.”
Unpublished.
Samuels, David. 2002. “Progressive ambition, federalism, and pork-barreling in Brazil.” Leg-
islative Politics in Latin America, 315: 340.
Weingast, Barry R, Kenneth A Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. 1981. “The Political
Economy of Benets and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics.” Journal
of Political Economy, 89(4): 642–64.
Wittman, Donald. 1983. “Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternative theories.” The
American political science review, 77: 142–157.
27
